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Abstract
Corporate Boards usually come in two diﬀerent shapes: unitary and dual. In the former, a single
board/principal is responsible for monitoring and establishing performance targets; in the latter,
these tasks are split between two boards/principals. This paper compares these two arrangements
in terms of corporate performance and managerial self-dealing for a situation in which the CEO has
private information. The equilibrium set of the common agency game induced by the dual board
structure is fully characterized. Compared to a single board, a dual board demands less aggressive
performance targets from the CEO, but exerts more monitoring. An unambiguous consequence of
the ﬁrst feature is that the CEO always exerts less eﬀort toward production with a dual board.
Due to the reduction in performance targets, the eﬀect of a dual board on CEO’s self-dealing is
ambiguous: there are equilibria in which, in spite of the increase in monitoring, self-dealing is higher
in a dual system.
“It would be a mistake for supervisory powers to be separated oﬀ in the boardroom.”
(The Financial Times, January, 14, 2003)
“Another problem is that audit committees are evolving into mini-boards.” (The Economist,
March 20, 2004)
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent corporate scandals have drawn a great deal of attention to the potential lack of oversight over
managers exercised by corporate boards. Indeed, scandals at Enron, Tyco, WorldCom among others
have motivated both legislative (the Sarbanes — Oxley Act of 2002 in the U.S.) and regulatory (e.g.,
new corporate governance guidelines of the New York Stock Exchange) changes in corporate practice
requirements, with special focus on the monitoring role to be exercised by boards of directors.
Despite the fact that monitoring the CEO is an important part of a board of directors’ duties, it is
widely acknowledged that, in addition to monitoring, directors also play a fundamental role in advising,
developing strategy and establishing goals for the companies they serve (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989).
An important question then is whether these roles are in conﬂict, and if so, how to design the board
s t r u c t u r es oa st om a x i m i z ei t se ﬀectiveness in both of these tasks.
This paper aims to provide a partial answer to this broad question by comparing the eﬀects on
corporate performance and managerial self-dealing of a switch from a situation in which the CEO reports
to a single board that is responsible for both monitoring management and establishing performance
targets to an alternative in which the CEO reports to two diﬀerent boards, one that is responsible for
monitoring the management and the other that is in charge of deﬁning performance targets.1
Both types of arrangements are seen in practice. In fact, boards tend to be structured as either
unitary or two-tiered. Unitary boards can be found in countries as the United States, England and
Italy, while for countries such as Germany, Holland and Austria the two-tiered system is adopted. In
the ﬁrst system, all directors stand legally responsible for both managing the company’s business and
monitoring the CEO. In the model, this would correspond to a situation in which management reports
to one principal. In a two-tier board, the managing and monitoring tasks are legally split between a
board of managers and a supervisory board. A natural interpretation of this scheme is that the CEO is
supposed to report to two diﬀerent principals.
The relative merits of these arrangements have been the focus of much discussion among practitioners,
scholars and legislators (see, for instance, Roe (1993) and Romano (1993)). The clear separation of tasks
and its potential positive eﬀect on the amount of oversight over the CEO is generally believed to be one
of the most desirable features of a two-tiered system. Indeed, as there seems to be general consensus
that boards tend to be too cozy with management, such a belief has induced a movement in the U.S.
toward a system that resembles, de facto, at w o - t i e r e do n e .
More concretely, in response to a string of corporate malfeasance scandals, the Sarbanes — Oxley
1The establishment and review of performance are some of the most important duties credited to board of direc-
tors. As an example, the 2004 “OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance” lists, as the ﬁrst responsibility of a
board, “the reviewing, and guiding of major plans of action, (...) and the setting of performance objectives.” (see
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf)
2Act of 2002 and the new Corporate Governance Rules of the NYSE specify that companies in the U.S.
should have a committee exclusively responsible for the appointment, compensation and scrutiny of
outside auditors.2 Such a requirement is in its essence an assignment of monitoring and management
activities to diﬀerent entities in the boardroom. Some have been expressing concern regarding the
implications of such changes in the eﬀectiveness of corporate boards, but it is obvious that those changes
have as a premise the belief that such task separation will induce more monitoring of the CEO.3
It is undeniable that, ﬁxing the level of all other instruments available to align the CEO’s interests
to the shareholders’, the more monitoring performed by the board, the better. Therefore, implicit in any
argument that favors one structure over the other (in terms of the amount of monitoring it induces) is
the assumption that all other “incentive” instruments are held constant. However, this is not necessarily
true. In fact, it may be the case that in response to more monitoring exerted by one principal, the
other principal decides to reduce the level of other instruments if they are substitutes in the provision
of incentives.
Therefore, a thorough comparative analysis of the beneﬁts and costs of making the CEO to report
to one or two boards must take into account (i) the existence of a myriad of instruments to align his
incentives with the shareholders’, and, perhaps more importantly, (ii) that an institutional framework
that assigns diﬀerent roles to diﬀerent principals may induce strategic interaction among them. These
points — especially the second — seem to have been ignored on most of the theoretical and practical
discussions about the optimal way to structure corporate boards.
This paper addresses explicitly some of these issues in a simple model in which a CEO can exert
eﬀort toward production (e.g., motivation of staﬀ members, negotiation of important contracts for the
company) and the pursuit of ineﬃcient self-dealing operations (e.g., cash and asset diversion). In the
model, eﬀort toward production is unobservable. While the same is in principle true for self-dealing
operations, upon monitoring/auditing the CEO, the board may ﬁnd hard evidence of it with some
probability. In those states, the amount of the operation can be fully recouped.
Monitoring, however, is a costly activity as it requires time, eﬀort, and expertise. Additionally, and
more related to the question the paper tries to answer, it is generally acknowledged that directors fear
to be perceived as having a confrontational attitude towards the CEO.4 It is reasonable, therefore, to
assume that part of such cost is personal and hard to contract upon. Moreover, such an assumption
2See, for instance, the new NYSE Corporate Governance guidelines at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/ﬁnalcorpgovrules.pdf.
Concomitantly, such movement has been accompanied by recommendations for, and implementation of, higher incen-
tives for board members in charge of monitoring (see, for example, the A.T. Kearney’s Corporate Governance Survey at
www.atkearney.com/shared_res/pdf/Corporate_Boards_S.pdf ).
3Manifestations of concern abound in the popular press. See, for instance, the special report on Corporate Boards in
the 03/20/2004 issue of The Economist.
4One of the directors interviewed by Mace (1986) puts it as follows: “You don’t say everything you think at a board
meeting. There is a certain amount of professional courtesy if you are going to be a good director.”
3incorporates the notion that the board is often “captured” by the CEO. From a modelling perspective,
this cost introduces a misalignment between the shareholder’s and the board’s interests.
A measure of total revenues (which is aﬀe c t e db yb o t ht y p e so fe ﬀorts) is available so the board can
also demand from the CEO the attainment of certain performance targets. Consequently, incentives can
be “input” based (auditing/monitoring) or “output” based (Lazear (1995)). The paper analyzes how the
use of both of these instruments changes when one moves from a unitary board structure to a two-tier
structure.
It is often observed that the board of directors has to rely on information provided by the CEO to
perform its duties (see Mace (1986), for example). As an example, if the CEO is better informed than
the board about the current market conditions, it becomes harder for the board to establish performance
targets that are compatible with the environment the ﬁrm is operating on (e.g., the CEO may claim to
be in an adverse environment in order to justify a low output target). Hence, eliciting proper information
from the management turns out to be also an important issue for corporate boards. This idea is captured
in the model by assuming the CEO has private information regarding the quality of project the ﬁrm has
access to.
The interaction of information asymmetry with the non-observability of eﬀort and the possibility of
the pursuit of self-dealing by management makes the problem of designing an optimal contract non-trivial
for the boards. In particular, a contract that induces levels of eﬀort and self-dealing that maximize the
company’s proﬁts will not be attained under neither of the structures.
A unitary board that decides both on monitoring and performance measures internalizes all beneﬁts
and costs of these choices. This is not optimal if they are to act on behalf of shareholders because of
the non-contractible monitoring costs. In a two-tier board, each principal’s contract speciﬁes the level
of the variables under their control, and each contract must be a best response to the other. Neither
board fully internalizes the eﬀects of their choices on their peers’ payoﬀ.
As it turns out, such externalities induce, for all possible equilibria of the game played among the
boards, more monitoring of the CEO by the supervisory board when compared to the unitary board
case. However, it is also the case that a dual structure induces less aggressive performance targets.
These two features of a dual system (more monitoring and lower performance targets) are intrinsically
related. This follows because, in the model, performance targets and monitoring levels are complements
in the CEO’s utility. More monitoring, by reducing the marginal beneﬁt of the pursuit of self-dealing,
reduces his eﬀort towards this activity. Such reduction, in turn, decreases his marginal cost to deliver
more aggressive performance targets. Consequently, the supervisory board, when deciding on how much
to monitor, perceives the increased performance targets the CEO is willing to deliver as an additional
beneﬁt of monitoring. This is the source of higher monitoring in a dual structure. Moreover, since
targets and monitoring are substitute incentive instruments to preclude self-dealing, the management
4board will reduce targets. Finally, this reduction reinforces the perception of an additional beneﬁto f
monitoring by the supervisory board, and the equilibrium features just described ensue.
The combination of more monitoring and lower performance targets have ambiguous consequences
for self-dealing. On the one hand, for a ﬁxed level of performance targets, the more monitored the
manager is, the less self-dealing he will pursue. On the other hand, for a ﬁxed level of monitoring, the
less aggressive the demand for performance, the higher the incentive for the CEO to exert eﬀort towards
self-dealing rather than toward production. As a result, despite of the higher level of monitoring, there
always exist equilibria in which the level of self-dealing increases for a (positive measure) set of projects
in a two-tier board case relative to the unitary one.
The eﬀect of a switch from unitary boards to two-tiered boards on productive eﬀort is unambiguous:
in all possible equilibria, eﬀort will decrease with a dual structure. Therefore, an inevitable cost of
splitting the tasks in the boardroom is the reduction of the amount of eﬀort towards production. Even
worse news is that such a decrease in eﬀort towards production may be accompanied by more self-dealing.
The set-up of the model and the timing of events are described in section 2. In section 3, the model
is solved for the benchmark in which the quality of the project is known to the boards. Section 4
solves the model for the unitary board case under asymmetric information. Section 5 characterizes the
set of equilibria induced by the two-tiered structure and shows that an immediate comparison between
monitoring levels in dual and unitary structures can be made by only looking at the supervisory board’s
best response to any contract oﬀered by the management board that may arise in equilibrium. Section 6
compares both arrangements in terms of their induced amount of self-dealing, performance targets, and
productive eﬀort. Section 7 discusses the related literature and section 8 draws the concluding remarks.
All proofs are relegated to Appendix A. Appendix B analyzes the cases in which, in a dual structure,
the boards move sequentially and can communicate the information extracted from the CEO.
2M o d e l
The ﬁrst player in the model is a CEO who works for a company endowed with a project of quality θ.
He can exert productive eﬀort and, by virtue of his control over the company’s activities, can extract
resources (self-deal) from the ﬁrm. The company’s revenues are assumed to be contractible and are
given by y = θ + e1 − e2, where e1 is the CEO’s unobservable eﬀort towards production, and e2 is
the amount of resources he can allocate for self-dealing operations. There are many ways — ranging
from the purchase of a corporate jet to selling output below market prices to companies they (or some
acquaintances) own, from investing in unproﬁtable projects with empire building purposes to outright
cash and asset diversion — in which managers can use their discretion to derive private beneﬁts at the
expense of shareholders. These possibilities are captured by e2 in the model. The project’s quality, θ, is
5assumed to be CEO’s private information.
The other players are the principals to which the CEO reports. I analyze two diﬀerent arrangements.
The ﬁrst one has the CEO reporting to only one principal (unitary board) who cares about results
(revenues net of the payments made to the CEO) but dislike monitoring. In the other arrangement, he
reports to two diﬀerent principals (two-tier board). Both principals are assumed to care about results
but to dislike monitoring the management. More speciﬁcally, each principal maximizes revenues net of
the payments she makes to the CEO and the cost of monitoring.5 Their diﬀerence stems from the tasks
they are assigned, and the fact that each of them make (and care about) payments contingent solely on
the variables under their control.
There are many ways to motivate such preferences. First, there is extensive evidence that board
members tend to be captured by the CEO, or that directors fear to be perceived as having a confronta-
tional attitude toward management (Mace (1971), Lorsch and MacIver (1989)), so it seems reasonable
to assume they dislike monitoring.6 Moreover, as speciﬁed in any Board Charter, board members should
act on behalf of shareholders. This along with the fact that a huge chunk of director’s beneﬁti sr e l a t e d
to morale, prestige and the possibility of being appointed as a board member for several companies
(Mace (1986)) would justify their concern with the results of the ﬁrm. Finally, the justiﬁcation for, in a
dual board system, the principals caring solely about the payments they make could also be related to
career concerns. The “market evaluation” of, say, a member of the management board will be relatively
more sensitive to the outcomes of the variables he has a say on (performance targets in this case) so it
seems natural to assume that he will be more willing to focus on providing incentives for that activity
when compared to a Supervisory Board member, and vice-versa.7
Regarding the two types of eﬀort the CEO can exert, e1 and e2, a fundamental distinction between
them is that, upon monitoring/auditing the CEO, the board can recoup part of the resources associated
with the self-dealing operation. More speciﬁcally, I assume that there exists a continuum of auditor’s
types p ∈ [0,1]. Upon hiring an auditor of type p, the board ﬁnds hard evidence of self-dealing operation
5Note that this changes the social surplus when one moves from a unitary to a dual board. The same would happen,
however, if both boards were to care about the sum of payments made to the CEO. The paper’s focus is on the shareholders’
welfare for which the relevant measure (proﬁts) is — of course — invariant to the board structure. Additionally, the results
would be the same for situations in which the social surplus is held ﬁxed across arrangements and the supervisory board’s
stake on y is large enough. In fact, what is important for the results is that the supervisory board cares about output,
which is in line with the trend towards providing steeper incentives for board members.
6The assumption that even the board who sets targets dislike monitoring can be justiﬁed in terms of directorship
interlocking (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). A director who has the CEO of the ﬁrm he is serving for as board member of the
company he manages may dislike monitoring on the grounds that this may induce more watchful policies in the company
he manages.
7Dewatripont et al (1999), for instance, argue formally about the potential beneﬁts of “focus” in career concern models
a la Holmstrom (1999).
6with that probability. Moreover, if hard evidence is found, the resources can be fully recouped.8
The tougher the auditor hired by the board, the higher the (personal) cost incurred by the boards.
For simplicity, I assume this cost to be given by
p2
2 , and I take the monetary cost of hiring an auditor
(e.g., payments to be made) as being the same irrespective of p and equal to zero. Throughout the
paper, I will refer to the choice of the auditor type as the monitoring level proposed by the board.
Regarding the project, the boards view its quality as being distributed over the interval [θ,θ] ⊆ (0,1]
according to the c.d.f. F(θ), with corresponding density f(θ). Throughout the analysis, it will be assumed
that the distribution satisﬁes
(A1) f(θ) is strictly log concave and diﬀerentiable, and
(A2) f(θ) ≥ 1
The ﬁr s tp a r to f( A 1 )i m p l i e st h a t
1−F(θ)
f(θ) is strictly decreasing in θ (Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 1989),
which guarantees the satisfaction of a monotonicity condition in the unitary board case. Diﬀerentiability
is used to characterize the equilibrium set of the common agency game induced by the two-tier system.
(A2) suﬃces to assure that, for the unitary board case, all non-negativity constraints are satisﬁed and to
allow for a clear-cut global comparison of the policies induced by the two diﬀerent arrangements under
analysis.
The CEO’s preferences over payments, eﬀorts and monitoring levels are represented by









where w is the total pay made to him by the principals. There are two implicit assumptions in the
speciﬁcation of the manager’s preferences that deserve being mentioned.
The ﬁrst of them is that there are no exogenous outside punishments (e.g., going to jail) for being
caught pursuing self-dealing operations. The realism of such assumption is clearly contingent on the
nature of corporate malfeasance.9 As argued above, there is a whole range of types of private beneﬁts
a manager can generate upon being in control. While for some of those it is unlikely that, even if
caught, the CEO will incur in such penalties, for others (outright theft, for example) the same is not
true. However, such outside punishments tend to be lump-sum. As I am concerned with the level of
corporate malfeasance, as long as expected outside punishment is not big enough, such an assumption
is inessential.
The second assumption, coming from the term −
e2
2
2 in his preferences, is that eﬀort towards corporate
8With such hard evidence, shareholders could go to court and try and overturn the business decision associated with
e2. In fact, as described by Hopt (1992, p. 139), “the remedy most commonly sought against someone who is considered to
have breached his ﬁduciary obligations to his company is an account and payment of the proﬁts derived from his allegedly
improper conduct. Sometimes a claim is laid to particular assets in his hands, or even to the entirety of a business developed
from the infringing activity on the basis of a constructive trust.”
9Although Hopt’s (1992) quote again provides a justiﬁcation for the assumption made.
7malfeasance is ineﬃcient. If self-dealing was neutral from an eﬃciency point of view, the possibility of
its pursuit by the CEO would pose no substantial problems for the board(s). Indeed, one could allow
the CEO to perform as much self-dealing as he wanted and reduce his pay by the exact same amount.
2.1 Timing of Events and The Contract Space
The timing of the events is depicted in ﬁgure 1. Initially, at period zero, the ﬁrm is set, the board
structure is deﬁned, and a CEO is hired. In period 1, the CEO learns privately the quality, θ,o ft h e
project.
In period 2, if the board structure is unitary, a unique set of contracts {w(y,p),y,p}y∈R,p∈[0,1],
specifying payments, monitoring levels and performance targets, is oﬀered to the CEO. In case the
board structure is two-tier, two set of contracts are oﬀered: {tm(y),y,}y∈R by the management board
and {ts(p),p}p∈[0,1] by the supervisory board, where, respectively, tm(y) and ts(p) are the payments made
to the CEO upon the latter compromising delivering y and accepting being monitored with intensity
p.10

















The CEO picks the contracts that ﬁt him better in period 3 (in the two-tier structure, he must contract
with both principals, i.e., the model is one of intrinsic common agency (Bernheim and Whinston (1986))
and then chooses how much to pursue of eﬀort towards production and self-dealing taking into account
his performance target compromise, y and the fact that he will be monitored with intensity p. Payments
are made in the end of the period when y is made public.
In period 4, the auditor hired by the board monitors and ﬁnds hard evidence of corporate malfeasance
with probability p. The amount self-dealt is fully recouped in such case.
10Obviously, the supervisory board can, in principle, impose a certain monitoring level and make no payments whatsoever
to the CEO as long as his participation constraint is kept satisﬁed.
83 The CEO’s Induced Cost Function and a Useful Benchmark
To solve the model, it is convenient to start with the CEO’s problem of choosing the amount of eﬀorts
in period 3 once he has committed to deliver y in revenue and knows he will be monitored with intensity
p.H ec h o o s e sb o t he ﬀorts to minimize his total costs net of his expected self-dealing beneﬁts subject to










− (1 − p)e2
s.t. y = θ + e1 − e2.
Substituting e1 from the constraint in the objective function, his induced cost to provide y in targets
when the monitoring intensity is p,i s
c(y,p;θ)=m i n
e2






− (1 − p)e2.






2 , if y ≤ 1 − p + θ
0, otherwise
It follows that, in period 1, the board(s) can choose the incentive instruments treating the CEO
as if he had utility function w − c(y,p;θ). An important feature for the analysis to follow is that the
CEO’s marginal cost of providing performance targets is decreasing in monitoring levels, i.e., targets
and monitoring are complements in his (induced) preferences. This is because an increase in monitoring
induces a lower pursuit of self-dealing which decreases the CEO’s marginal cost to deliver y.
3.1 Symmetric Information
In order to understand better the forces at play in the model, and, in particular, the diﬃculties faced
by the boards in inducing both high eﬀort and no self-dealing from the CEO, it is worth analyzing the
model for the case in which the quality of the project is known by the boards. In this case, irrespective
of its structure, the board(s) can contract with the CEO in a way that attains the highest possible level
of proﬁts despite of the costly monitoring. In fact, it turns out not to be necessary to monitor the CEO
when θ is known.
To see this, consider ﬁrst the unitary board’s case. When the quality of the project is known,
normalizing the CEO’s outside option to zero, its problem is one of maximizing y +pe2(p,y;θ)−w −
p2
2








The solution to this problem entails y =1+θ and p =0 . Such combination, while sparing the
boards from the cost of monitoring the CEO, induces no self-dealing and a proﬁt maximizing level of
productive eﬀort. A widely known interpretation of this outcome is that the ﬁrm is “sold” to the CEO
(for the wage that induces this combination of performance targets and monitoring and leaves no rents
for the CEO is given by y−θ− 1
2). Being the residual claimant of the ﬁrm’s revenues, he will decide not
to self-deal, so the monitoring instrument will not have to be used. Intuitively, the possibility of selling
the ﬁrm to the CEO should not depend on the way the board is structured. In fact, one can verify that
y =1+θ and p =0also constitutes an equilibrium in a two-tier board system.
Proposition 1 If the quality of the project is known by the boards, the chosen contract by a unitary
board attains the highest possible level of proﬁts for the company, and no self-dealing. Moreover, for the
two-tier board case, there is always an equilibrium that mimics the unitary board’s outcome.
A setting with private information introduces two new eﬀects. First, as the board is forced to rely on
the CEO’s information to set targets, it is optimal to distort down the level of targets in a unitary system.
This distortion introduces an endogenous motive for monitoring: for the same amount of monitoring
exerted in the full information case, namely p =0 , a reduction in the demanded performance induces
positive self-dealing and, as a consequence, a beneﬁt for monitoring. Putting somewhat diﬀerently, as
performance targets and monitoring are substitute instruments to preclude self-dealing, the reduction of
the former introduces the need for the latter. Second, a structure that separates the board’s duties will
always introduce a non-trivial strategic interdependence between the management and the supervisory
boards. This will make the policies chosen under each structure diﬀerent in all circumstances. Therefore,
the board structure “irrelevance” result breaks down when the CEO has private information.
4 Asymmetric Information: The Unitary Board Case
Under asymmetric information, when the board structure is unitary, matters are relatively simple. By
the Revelation Principle, one can restrict attention to direct mechanisms in which the CEO reports a
project quality b θ to the principal and is demanded to attain y(b θ), monitored with intensity p(b θ), and
receive a payment of w(b θ).
The board’s problem can be written as
max
{y(θ),p(θ),w(θ)}




10U(θ)=w(θ) − c(y(θ),p(θ);θ) ≥ w(b θ) − c(y(b θ),p(b θ);θ) for all θ,b θ
U(θ)=w(θ) − c(y(θ),p(θ);θ) ≥ 0 for all θ and p(θ) ∈ [0,1].
When compared to the symmetric case, the board faces a new set of constraints: it must be in the
CEO’s best interest to report the true project quality rather than any other. An application of the
Envelope Theorem (Milgrom and Segal, 2002) along with a single crossing condition that the CEO’s




(y(τ)+e2(p(τ),y(τ);τ) − τ)dτ, (1)
and y(θ) − p(θ) being non-decreasing in θ.




(y(τ)+e2(p(τ),y(τ);τ) − τ)dτ + c(y(θ),p(θ);θ).
Substituting this in the objective function, integrating by parts, and noting that participation is guaran-
teed whenever the CEO with the worst project gets non-negative utility, the board’s program becomes
max
{y(θ),p(θ)},U(θ)
Eθ(y + pe2(p,y;θ) − c(y,p;θ) − (U(θ)+
(1 − F(θ))
f(θ)




s.t. U(θ) ≥ 0,y (θ) − p(θ) non-decreasing in θ and p(θ) ∈ [0,1].
It is optimal to set U(θ) equal to zero. Moreover, ignoring the other constraints and maximizing the
objective pointwise, one has, using (A1), and (A2)







The induced amount of self-dealing is e2(p(θ),y(θ);θ)=
(1−F(θ))
3f(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ,θ).
The contract oﬀered by the board induces positive self-dealing whenever the project quality is not
the highest one. The interpretation for this is that the eliciting of information requires the provision —
through a higher wage — of some rents to the CEO. To reduce the size of such rents, the board demands
from management less aggressive performance targets. This, in turn, reduces the CEO’s marginal cost
to pursue self-dealing. The remaining instrument to preclude self-dealing is monitoring. However,
monitoring is costly from the board’s perspective.
11From the point of view of the shareholders, a unitary board exerts a sub-optimal amount of oversight
over the CEO. If the shareholders were in charge of hiring the auditor themselves, they would rather,
taking as ﬁxed the performance targets set by the board, increase the monitoring to some level in the
range [
1−F(θ)
f(θ) ,1] to preclude self-dealing altogether.11
The latter point has triggered some discussion on the potential beneﬁts of moving to a dual system,
and, more importantly, a whole set of new rules intended to increase the oversight over the management
in the U.S. Most of these changes have as a practical consequence the separation of management and
supervisory tasks to diﬀerent bodies in the boardroom, much as in a two-tier board scheme. The next
section analyses, using the above model, some possible consequences of these changes.
5 Asymmetric Information: The Two-Tier Board Case
Solving the model for the two-tier board case involves some additional complications. The main issue is
that the principals must be oﬀering menus of contracts that are mutual best responses. The strategic link
among boards comes from the preferences of the CEO; more speciﬁcally, from the induced cost function
c(y,p;θ). Whenever the CEO’s optimal choice of eﬀorts involves positive self-dealing, his utility function
depends in a non-separable way on both y and p. In such case, the contract he is willing to take from
the supervisory board will depend on the contract oﬀered by the management board and vice-versa. A
slight complication in my setting is that whether or not the amount of self-dealing is positive depends,
in turn, on the contracts oﬀered by the boards. In other words, the possibility of strategic interaction
is endogenous and related to the CEO’s hidden actions. It turns out, however, that a two-tier structure
does not preclude self-dealing.
Proposition 3 For (almost) all projects of quality θ ∈ [θ,θ), the CEO will be pursuing self-dealing in
equilibrium.
Proposition 3 guarantees that, given an atomless density function f(θ), one can focus without loss on
equilibria in which self-dealing is pursued for all θ ∈ [θ,θ). The Proposition’s result follows because any
pair of contracts that induces no self-dealing from the CEO generates an incentive for at least one of the
boards to “free-ride” on the other. As an illustration, the best response from the supervisory board to a
menu of contracts oﬀered by the management board that does not induce self-dealing is not monitor at
all. But if the supervisory board does not monitor, it can never be optimal for the management board
to demand targets that induces no corporate malfeasance, as this would imply that too much rent is left
to the CEO.
11There are many reasons why shareholders may not be able to monitor the CEO themselves (or, more realistically,
impose contractually on the board auditing standards that would correspond to more monitoring of the top management).
In my view, the most compelling are their potential lack of expertise and atomicity.
12On top of the intrinsic diﬃculties related to ﬁnding a proﬁle of mutual best responses, the strategic
interdependence brings a major practical complication: the restriction to Direct Revelation Mechanisms
is with loss of generality. However, as shown by Martimort and Stole (2002), an extension of the Taxation
Principle (see, Salanie, 1997) — the Delegation Principle —, applies and the whole equilibrium set can
be computed using a fairly simple methodology. The next section, by considering each of the boards’
problem, describe brieﬂy such methodology for the present model.
5.1 The Boards’ Problems
The main idea is to consider individually each of the principal’s problem for a ﬁxed set of contracts
oﬀered by the other. In such case, under some assumptions that have to be checked in equilibrium,
the methodology used in the single board case fully applies and the problem reads exactly as a single
principal’s one.
Consider the supervisory’s board problem. Letting {tm(y),y}y∈<+ be a menu of contracts oﬀered
by the management board, the CEO will choose among them the one that maximizes his utility. As a
consequence, it is as if the supervisory board had to deal with a CEO with preferences given by
Φ(ts,p;θ)=ts + φ(p;θ), (2)
where φ(p;θ)=m a x y tm(y)−c(y,p;θ), and y(p;θ) is the solution to this program. Therefore, for a ﬁxed
set of contracts oﬀered by the other board, the supervisory board’s problem is exactly the same as the
one of a single principal deciding only on monitoring and facing a manager with preferences described
by (2) In particular, the Revelation Principle fully applies and attention can be restricted to Direct
Mechanisms of the form {p(b θ),t s(b θ)}b θ.
Deﬁning Φ(θ)=m a x b θ Φ(ts(b θ),p(b θ),θ), and using the Envelope Theorem, incentive compatibility is,




(y(p(τ);τ)+e2(p,y(p(τ);τ);τ) − τ)dτ (3)
and
dp(θ)
dθ ≥ 0. It is important to notice that the single crossing condition (φpθ ≥ 0) needed to replace
the incentive compatibility constraints by the above two conditions is now endogenous: it depends on
the set of contracts oﬀered by the management board, and has to be checked in equilibrium.
Ignoring this issue for now, and proceeding exactly in the same fashion as in the unitary board
case (i.e., integrating condition (3) by parts and substituting ts(θ) in the objective function, as well as
imposing Φ(θ)=0 ), the board’s problem becomes
max
p E(y(p;θ)+pe2(y(p;θ),p;θ)) + φ(p;θ) −
(1 − F(θ))
f(θ)


























2f(θ) ] is added to the optimality
condition. The term
dy(p;θ)
dp is positive — since
∂2c(y,p;θ)
∂y∂p < 0 —, reﬂecting the fact that the CEO is willing
to pick a more aggressive performance target from the menu oﬀered by the management board if the
supervisory board monitors more. This is perceived, from the supervisory board’s part as an additional






2f(θ) ] < 0 captures the overall increase in the costs
incurred by the supervisory board due to the more aggressive targets induced by a higher monitoring.
Under (A2), the costs are smaller than the beneﬁts for all possible θ.
Proposition 4 In response to any set of contracts {tm(y),y}y∈< oﬀered by the management board that
may arise in equilibrium, the monitoring exerted by the supervisory board will be strictly larger than the
one in the unitary structure.
Hence, the externalities introduced by the separation of tasks in the boardroom are such that the
CEO is watched more closely in a dual structure in any possible equilibrium. Interestingly, this result is
solely a consequence of the separation of tasks in the boardroom.
Now consider the management board’s problem. Following the same steps as the ones above,12 its






















2f(θ) + e2(p(y,θ),y);θ) −
3p(y,θ)
2 ].I n
contrast to the supervisory board case, this term cannot be signed without additional equilibrium con-
siderations.
5.2 Equilibrium
Equations (4) and (5) describe the optimality condition for each board given the set of contracts proposed





which measure, respectively, how the optimal choice of performance (monitoring) by the CEO responds to
an increase in the monitoring (performance) level exerted (requested) by the supervisory (management)
12That is, ﬁxing {p,ts(p)}p∈[0,1],letting ψ(y;θ)=m a x p ts(p) − c(y,p;θ),a n dp(y;θ) be its solution.One can proceed as
if the CEO had preferences given by tm(y)+ψ(y;θ) and follow the steps just described.
14board — when those are evaluated in equilibrium, and (ii) to verify whether the single crossing conditions
ap r i o r i assumed to replace the incentive compatibility constraints by the “ﬁrst order” and monotonicity
conditions for truthtelling hold in the candidate equilibria. In Appendix A, the following characterization
of the equilibrium set is derived.





































for boundary conditions deﬁned by e2(θ)=0and some p(θ) bounded below by 1
2and above by 1.C o n -
versely, any solution of the system with such boundary conditions satisfying p(θ) ≥ 1
2 is an equilibrium.
6T h e E ﬀects of Splitting the Board’s Duties
6.1 The Eﬀects on Targets and Productive Eﬀort
The diﬀerent equilibria in the dual structure are indexed by the amount of monitoring exercised over
the CEO with the best project, p(θ). In a unitary board, such a CEO is not monitored at all. This is
so because, given the performance target demanded from the CEO who reports to have access to the
highest quality project, 1+θ, monitoring is not needed. The reason is clear: for such a high performance
target, the CEO’s marginal cost of pursuing self-dealing e2 is 1+2e2 , while the marginal beneﬁti s1−p.
The marginal cost is (weakly) larger than the beneﬁt for all p,a n de2. Therefore, positive self-dealing
will not be pursued irrespective of the monitoring exerted by the board. Since monitoring is costly, the
board optimally chooses to give full discretion to the CEO.
In a two-tier system, on the other hand, the supervisory board will be watching the CEO with the
highest quality project with intensity p(θ) > 0. It is illuminating to understand why this is so and
interpret it as an implication of free-riding from the management board’s part. When facing a CEO
of type θ, the supervisory board considers, as a beneﬁt, that an increment in monitoring will induce
the CEO to take a contract with the management board that demands more aggressive performance




2 ]. Such expression is strictly positive because
the management board will demand, in any equilibrium, exactly y(θ)=1− p(θ)+θ, so that a CEO
with a project of quality θ close to θ will be pursuing positive self-dealing. Put somewhat diﬀerently,
the perceived beneﬁt that induces positive monitoring from the type θ CEO exists only because the
15management board free-rides on monitoring and demands less aggressive results in the ﬁrst place. If the
boards could move to a situation in which higher performance targets, say y(θ)=1+θ, were demanded
of (and, accordingly, less oversight were exerted on) the type θ CEO, some of the eﬀects discussed below
would not prevail. Yet such an outcome cannot happen in equilibrium because this would require, for
types nearby θ, a combination of policies inducing no self-dealing. Proposition 3 rules this out.
This free-riding problem does not impede the boards to preclude self-dealing from a CEO with
project θ. However, as performance targets is the only force able to induce eﬀort towards production for
aC E Ow i t hp r o j e c tθ, such CEO will be exerting less eﬀort in a two-tier board than in a unitary board.
It turns out that the level of performance targets in a two-tier system is, in any equilibrium, always
smaller than for a unitary board. As consequence, the eﬀort towards productive activities will always
be smaller for a two-tier board. More explicitly, letting, y1P and y2P, and e1P
1 and e2P
1 be, respectively,
the levels of performance targets and eﬀort towards production in the unitary and two-tiered structures
Proposition 6 Irrespective of the equilibrium considered in the two-principal case, y1P(θ) ≥ y2P(θ) for
all θ. The latter implies that e2P
1 (θ) <e 1P
1 (θ) for all θ.
Therefore, the model suggests that an unavoidable outcome of splitting the tasks in the boardroom
is the demand of lower performance targets and the resulting reduction of the amount of eﬀort towards
production.
6.2 The Eﬀects on Self-Dealing
One could argue that the resulting reduction in the level of productive eﬀort exerted by the CEO in
a dual system is an unfortunate, but necessary, cost to be incurred in order to reduce the amount of
ineﬃcient corporate malfeasance. In fact, it could be claimed that the cost in terms of lower performance
targets has as a positive counterpart the increase in the amount of monitoring exerted by the directors.
This reasoning, however, ignores that the demanded performance targets aﬀect the marginal cost of
pursuing self-dealing. On the one hand, for a ﬁxed level of monitoring, the less aggressive the demand
for performance, the higher the incentives for the CEO to pursue self-dealing. On the other hand,
by Proposition 4, the Supervisory Board monitors more the CEO and for a ﬁxed level of performance
target, the more monitored the manager is, the less self-dealing he has incentives to pursue. On intuitive
grounds, it seems that the overall eﬀect on self-dealing should be ambiguous.
Proposition 7 In any equilibrium in which p(θ) > 3
5, there exists θ
∗ ∈ [θ,θ) such that e2P
2 (θ) >
e1P
2 (θ) for θ ∈ (θ
∗,θ].For equilibria in which p(θ) ≤ 3
5, the amount self-dealt in a two-tier system is
smaller than in a unitary one for at least a subset of projects.
The interesting fact about the above result is that equilibria associated with higher monitoring levels
are the ones that seem to induce more corporate malfeasance. This indicates that a thorough analysis
16of the beneﬁts of having the CEO being monitored more closely must necessarily take into account the
induced (equilibrium) responses in the use of other instruments available to align his interests to the
shareholders’. This point is particularly relevant for an institutional framework that assigns the control
over diﬀerent incentive instruments to diﬀerent and independent bodies as in a dual board system, or
as has been the case in the U.S. regarding transforming the audit committees into “mini-boards” as
suggested by the quote in the beginning of the paper.
As an illustration of Proposition 7, Figure 2 plots the levels for corporate malfeasance for the case
in which θ is uniformly distributed over [0.5,1] and the monitoring of the CEO with project quality 1
is p(1) = 2
3. Note that, for such case, the amount self-dealt in a two-tier structure (the darker line) is
higher than the amount self-dealt in a unitary system for all projects.
The discussion so far has focused on the induced amounts of productive eﬀort and self-dealing under
both institutional frameworks. Regarding proﬁts, it is easy to see that when the project quality is θ,t h e
proﬁt induced by a one-principal structure is higher than the one in a two-principal as both structures
induce no self-dealing and the former induces the proﬁt maximizing amount of productive eﬀort. A
continuity argument guarantees that the same is true for all θ close to θ. Unfortunately, as of yet, I have
not been able to characterize the relationship of proﬁt levels for the other possible θ
0s, in order to make
a global ranking of expected proﬁts.







self - dealing Figure 2: Self - Dealing , theta ~U@ 0.5 ,1D
However, I conjecture that the unitary board always fares better than the two-tiered one regarding
proﬁts. In fact, I have not been able to provide a numerical example for θ uniformly distributed in which
a two-tier board generates higher expected proﬁts.
177 Related Literature
This section compares my ﬁndings to the ones in related papers. Starting with the common agency
literature, my model diﬀers from Bernheim and Whinston (1986) in two ways. First, it is assumed that
the principals cannot make side-payments contingent on all the relevant variables. This assumption
implies that, in the full information benchmark, the outcome that maximizes the principals’ surplus
cannot be attained in equilibrium. In particular, the outcome which is the closest to the one associated
with “truthful equilibrium” in their paper is the one that resembles the unitary board’s outcome in
Proposition 1. Second, the bulk of the analysis of the present paper departs from theirs (and from
a series of papers that followed as Grossman and Helpman (1994), Dixit et al (1997), and others) by
analyzing the case in which the agent possesses private information.
The analysis of common agency games with asymmetric information was pioneered by Martimort
(1996), Stole (1991), and Martimort and Stole (2002, 2003). Focusing on non-linear pricing games, these
papers aim to understand how direct and indirect externalities among principals aﬀe c tt h es i z ea n dt h e
direction of the distortions in the allocations when compared to monopolistic settings. The objective
of the present paper is obviously analogous in the sense that it compares how the use of incentive
instruments is aﬀected by their control being in the hands of one or two principals. There are two aspects
in which the paper’s setting diﬀer from theirs however. First, the agent in the model can take hidden
actions on top of being better informed than the principal about a hidden characteristic.I n f a c t ,t h e
externalities among the principals arise endogenously as consequence of the model’s multi-task structure.
Second, the two incentive instruments enter both the principals’ and the agent’s utility function in an
asymmetric fashion. The analysis of asymmetric equilibria is, therefore, the only natural one. The
asymmetric equilibria analysis yields as distinguishing results (i) the level of the incentive instruments
moves in diﬀerent directions when compared to a single principal case, and, more interestingly, (ii) the
input based instrument is the one which is used more intensely.
In the theoretical literature on corporate boards, most of the papers seek to understand why passive
boards arise so their focus is mainly on the boards’ monitoring task. Hermalin and Weisbach’s (1998)
seminal paper provides a setting in which the board’s independence is endogenously determined in a
bargaining game with the CEO. A “high ability” CEO has greater bargain power, and can impose a less
independent board which exerts a lower amount of monitoring. In their paper — as in all others that
follow — monitoring refers to inferring the manager’s (ex-ante unknown to all players, including the CEO)
ability to run the company’s business. In my setting, the equivalent of the information regarding the
C E O ’ sa b i l i t yi se x t r a c t e dt h r o u g ht h eo ﬀered menu(s) of contracts. Also, monitoring refers to ﬁnding
out about a particular action taken by the CEO. In contrast to their paper, I take as given the degree
of the boards’ independence, and focus on the analysis of how the use of monitoring and performance
targets to align the CEO’s interests with the shareholders’ interact in a unitary system, and how the use
18of those instruments changes when one moves to a dual board structure.
In Almazan and Suarez (2003), a weak board is complementary to low incentive pays to the CEO
and may thus arise as the overall cost minimizing incentive structure of a company. In my model, less
monitoring is complementary to a higher incentive pay. A dual structure, by increasing monitoring
induces (through the demand of less aggressive targets) less powerful incentive pay. While saving on
accounting costs, low incentive pay diverts the CEO’s eﬀort from production to self-dealing operations
which are costly for the ﬁrm.
Adams and Ferreira (2004) analyze the board’s dual role as advisors and monitors of management.
In their model, the board may pre-commit to a reduced amount of monitoring to induce information
sharing which improves the decision regarding the pursuit of a project. In my model, in contrast, the
monitoring activity, by reducing the CEO’s marginal cost of delivering targets, improves the managerial
activities — productive eﬀort — so that a pre-commitment of a unitary board to perform more monitoring
can only improve matters. The possibility of assigning the right to ﬁre the manager (the monitoring
task) to an entity who does not have an advisory role — a dual structure — is considered in their paper.
This assignment solves the information disclosure problem but brings the possibility of a less eﬀective
monitoring policy since a signal regarding the CEO’s ability becomes unavailable to the monitoring
entity. The opposite holds in this paper: separation harms the executive activity the board performs,
but increases monitoring.
Finally, Hermalin (2004) considers the potential implications of a trend toward more diligent boards
on variables as the CEO tenure and compensation, and the external hires as CEOs. In this paper, I
consider how the trend towards a separation of tasks in the boardroom aﬀects the CEO’s monitoring,
the company’s performance and the pursuit of self-dealing activities.
8C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper aimed to provide a ﬁrst step towards answering the question of how one should optimally
design corporate boards by comparing a setting in which the CEO reports to a single principal who is
responsible for both monitoring management and establishing performance targets to one in which the
CEO reports to two diﬀerent principals, one who is responsible for monitoring the management and the
other who is in charge of deﬁning performance targets.
The main results are as follows. When compared to the unitary board case, a two-tier system will
result in (i) more monitoring and (ii) less aggressive performance targets demanded from the CEO.
The latter result implies that (iii) in all possible equilibria, productive eﬀort will be smaller in a dual
system. Finally, (i) and (ii) imply that (iv) the impact of a dual system on managerial self-dealing is
ambiguous: there are equilibria in which the amount self-dealt is higher in a two-tier system. Therefore,
19the separation of tasks in the boardroom and the concomitant provision of incentives for the monitors
may have perverse consequences on both productive eﬀort and self-dealing in spite of the increase in
monitoring.
Af e wﬁnal words about the robustness of these results seem in order. First, the main force behind
the results is the complementary fashion in which the incentive instruments enter the CEO’s induced
preferences. Arguably, this feature should be present in most incentive problems: the more residual
claimant of a ﬁrm’s results a manager is made, the more willing he is to be monitored. In other words,
the monitoring instrument only goes against a manager’s interests if his interests and the ﬁrm’s are apart.
Hence, the results don’t seem too dependent on the speciﬁc functional forms assumed for the eﬀort costs.
In particular, as long as the marginal cost of one eﬀort is not too decreasing in the other, targets and
monitoring levels would still be complements in the CEO’s preferences. Second, no assumption regarding
a possible technological advantage in monitoring brought by a dual structure was made. So long as the
marginal cost of positive monitoring is kept positive, such an assumption would only reinforce the results.
In fact, due to the additional technological motive for monitoring, it would be more likely that equilibria
as in Proposition 7 would arise. Finally, Appendix B shows that, neither by making the boards move
sequentially, nor by allowing one of the boards to communicate the information extracted from the CEO
to the other, matters can improved for the two-tier structure when compared to the unitary case.
9 Appendix A: Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 : The ﬁrst order (necessary and suﬃcient) optimality conditions for the








− (y + e2(p,y;θ) − θ)=0
where the above conditions use the fact that, by the Envelope Theorem, −
dc(y,p;θ)
dp = −e2(p,y;θ),a n d
−
dc(y,p;θ)
dy = −(y + e2(p,y;θ) − θ). It is clear that both equations imply the y and p in the text for the
unitary board case. Moreover, such y and p induce productive eﬀort of 1, and no self-dealing. Those two
features along with no monitoring imply that the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are maximized. As, for all θ, the CEO is
left with no rents, the outcome stated in the proposition holds.
For the two-tier system, consider ﬁrst the Supervisory’s Board Problem for a given {y,tm(y)}y oﬀered
by the Management Board. Let y∗(p;θ) be the solution to
max
y tm(y) − c(y,p;θ)
The Supervisory’s Board problem is to maximize, upon choosing p and ts(p),




ts(p)+tm(y∗(p;θ)) − c(y∗(p;θ),p;θ) ≥ 0









ts(p∗(y;θ)) + tm(y) − c(y,p∗(y;θ);θ) ≥ 0
where p∗(y;θ) is the solution to maxp ts(p) − c(y,p;θ).
Clearly, both constraints bind at an optimum. It is easy to see that y∗(p;θ)=1+θ for all p,and
p∗(y;θ)=0for all y form an equilibrium: if the supervisory does not monitor the CEO irrespective of
i t st y p ea n dt h el e v e lo fy, the solution to the management board entails y =1+θ and the converse. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2For ease of notation I will be denoting
1−F(θ)
f(θ) by H(θ) throughout this
and the other proofs. The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to y and p for pointwise maximization of




















dy =( y + e2 − θ)). It is easy to see that the solution to this system yields (i) and (ii) in the
Proposition. The amount of self dealing follows because e2(y,p;θ)=
1−p+θ−y
2 .¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :Assume, towards a contradiction, that there exists an equilibrium so that,
for some open set (θ
0,θ
00) ⊂ [θ,θ),e 2(p(θ),y(θ);θ)=0for all θ in (θ
0,θ
00). Fix the equilibrium {ts(p),p}p
and consider the management board’s problem. As argued in the text, it as if the Management Board
was facing a CEO with preferences given by ψ(y,θ)=m a x p ts −c(y,p;θ). Proceeding as in the text, its
problem becomes to maximize the following objective pointwise:
max
y y + p(y;θ)e2(y,p(y;θ);θ)+ψ(y,θ) − H(θ)(y + e2(y,p(y;θ);θ) − θ) −
p(y;θ)2
2
By assumption, for all types θ in (θ
0,θ
00), given their equilibrium choice of p, the Management Board
will optimally choose y in the range of the domain so that so that e2(p(θ),y(θ);θ)=0 , i.e., y ≥ 1+θ−p.
Therefore, there is a θ
∗ ∈ (θ
0,θ
00) so that for all θ ∈ (θ
∗,θ
00) not only the CEO will not self-deal, but
21also no explicit strategic interaction will ensue13 and the Management’s objective will read (note that I





(y − θ)2 − H(θ)(y − θ) −
p2
2
Hence, in response to the equilibrium menu oﬀered by the supervisory board, it must be the case that
y(θ)=1+θ − H(θ) which calls for p(θ) ≥ H(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θ
∗,θ
00). However, proceeding in exactly
the same fashion for the supervisory board, we see that, as monitoring is costly, the best response for
any y that do not induce self-dealing is p(θ)=0 , which generates a contradiction. Therefore, there can
be at most a zero measure set of projects in [θ,θ) in which the CEO does not self-deal. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :In the text.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :I proceed in several steps. The necessity part follows from Steps 1,3, and
4. Suﬃciency follows by combining Steps 3, 5, and 6.

















p(θ)+1 is analogous. Note
that p(y;θ) = argmaxp ts(p) − c(y,p;θ). By the Implicit Function Theorem, using interiority (which is








Additionally, in equilibrium, from the ﬁrst order condition of the above program, it must be the case
that for all θ
ts0
(p(θ)) − [e2(p(θ),y(θ);θ)] = 0, (6)

























STEP 2: In any diﬀerentiable equilibrium in which e2(y(θ),p(θ);θ)=0 ,o n em u s th a v e
·
p(θ) ≥ 0 for
all θ.
Proof: First, note that, in any diﬀerentiable equilibria, a CEO with type θ has to choose from the
Supervisory Board (given the equilibrium contract he picked from the Management Board) a contract
that satisﬁes (FCOS). A second order necessary condition for that being optimal is ts
00
(p(θ))+ 1
2 ≤ 0. As
13The qualiﬁer is needed. As an example, note that there may be equilibria for the dual board in the symmetric
information case in which the CEO does not self-deal but there is strategic dependence among the boards.








p(θ) so that necessarily the sign of
·
p(θ) has to be the same as the
one of
·
y(θ)−1. Therefore, if it was the case that
·
p(θ) < 0 for some θ ∈ [θ,θ] one would have
·
y(θ)−1 < 0.
The fact that e2(y(θ),p(θ);θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ,θ) assures that this cannot happen at θ (for, otherwise,
·
e2(θ) > 0 along with e2(θ)=0would imply that for some θ close to θ the amount of self-dealing would
be negative). If this happens for some θ bounded away from θ,b yc o n t i n u i t yo f
·
e2 in θ,t h e r em u s te x i s t
a θ
0 ∈ (θ,θ) so that
·
e2(θ






0), contradicting the fact
that the sign of
·
p(θ) h a st ob et h es a m ea st h eo n eo f
·
y(θ) − 1.¥
STEP 3: Given steps 1 and 2, one must have in any equilibrium
·





p(θ) ≥ 0 along with the integral representation of the CEO’s utility is equivalent
to the contract oﬀered by the supervisory board being incentive compatible if, and only if, φθp(p,θ) > 0.




dp − 1).Therefore, one needs to have
dy(p;θ)
dp − 1 ≥ 0 when this expression is evaluated at the
equilibrium p and y. As
dy(p;θ)




p(θ)+1, this can hold if, and only if,
·
y(θ) − 1 ≥
·
p(θ).
B yt h ev e r ys a m et o k e n ,
·
y(θ) > 0 (which is implied by
·
y(θ) − 1 having the same sign as
·
p(θ))a l o n g
with the integral representation of the CEO’s utility being incentive compatible calls for ψyθ(y,θ) > 0









y(θ)−1 and the result follows.¥
STEP 4: The Boundary Conditions must be as in the text.
Proof: Fix e2(y(θ),p(θ);θ)=0 .That p(θ) is bounded away from 1 follows because, otherwise, for
θ close enough to θ, e1(θ) would be negative which cannot hold. As for p(θ) being larger than 1
2, this


















p(θ) > 0 whenever p(θ) > 1
2. Additionally, so to guarantee that p(θ) ≥ 1
2,a s
.
p(θ) ≥ 0, it
m u s tb et h ec a s et h a tp(θ) is bounded away and from below by 1
2.To show that e2(y(θ),p(θ);θ)=0 ,note
that, given the equilibrium proﬁle oﬀered by the supervisory board, at θ, any y satisfying the second
equation in the system is a potential candidate for optimum (as the ﬁrst order condition is met). Among
those, given p(θ), the one that sets e2(y(θ),p(θ);θ)=0is the best as the management’s objective can
be written as












23and (i) e1− 1
2e2
1 is increasing in the range [0,1),(ii) e1 is increasing in y,(iii) the expression is decreasing
in e2., which, in turn, is decreasing in y.¥
STEP 5: If there is a solution to the system of diﬀerential equations so that (i) e2(y(θ),p(θ);θ)=0 ,
(ii)
.




p(θ)+1 ≥ 1,t h e n
·
y(θ) − 1 ≥
·
p(θ) for all θ





3 so that the claim is true at






















p(θ) ≥ 0,p (θ)=1




p(θ)=0for all such θ. Plugging the latter in
the second equation, one has
















So whenever e2(y(θ),p(θ);θ)=0 , and p(θ) ≥ 1
2, the endogenous single crossing conditions hold when
.
p(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ. Moreover, one has that the local concavity of the agent’s problems when dealing with
the CEO is guaranteed in such case. Finally, when p(θ) ≥ 1
2, one can show through simple calculations
that e1(θ) ≥ 0. It turns out that by imposing some additional conditions on the distribution and on
the value of θ, a solution to the system of diﬀerential equations with the properties required by Step
5 always exist. This, on its turn, assures the existence of equilibrium for the common agency game. I
impose these conditions “implicitly” in the next step.
STEP 6: Assume that e2(y(θ),p(θ);θ)=0 , and p(θ) is bounded below by 1
2. Take any e F(.) so that
the corresponding density satisﬁes (A1) and (A2), and consider an interval of the form [a,θ]. For any
solution of the system of diﬀerential equations for “projects” [a,θ] ⊂ (0,1] with distribution e F(.), there
is a θ ≥ a, and F(.) (whose density also satisﬁes (A1), and (A2)) so that, for the projects [θ,θ] with
distribution F(.), the conditions in Step 5 hold.













y(.)−1 never crosses zero strictly, the result follows trivially by letting
F(.)=e F(.),a n da = θ. Otherwise, let θ











0)−1 > 0 so that, by the ﬁr s te q u a t i o ni nt h es y s t e m ,
p(θ
0) > 1




00) for θ ≥ θ, and zero otherwise, the result follows
(it is easily seen that f(θ) is log concave and that (A2) is also satisﬁed). Note that this “suﬃcient”
condition can be replaced by one that states that the (endogenous) monitoring of the CEO with the
least productive project is larger than 1
2, as stated in the Proposition.¥
Proof of Proposition 6: Noting that e1 = y + e2−θ =
(y+1−p−θ)
2 and that, by Proposition 3,
p2P(θ) >p 1P(θ) for all θ, the second part is trivially true whenever y1P(θ) ≥ y2P(θ) for all θ. Towards
24a proof for the latter, note that if there is θ























For this to hold, one must have either
·
p(θ





2 ]=0 . To rule out the





























contradicting the fact that, necessarily, in equilibrium,
·
y(θ) − 1 ≥
·
p(θ) for all θ.
Therefore, it must be the case that
·
p(θ
0)=0 . As necessarily
·
y(θ
0)−1 ≥ 0, one must have p(θ
0) ≥ 1
2.
Using this fact it can be readily concluded, by continuity, that for all  >0 suﬃciently small14
H(θ
0 −  )
2
+ e2(p(θ
0 −  ),y(θ
0 −  ));θ
0 −  ) −
3p(θ









y(θ)−1 ≥ 0 for
all θ in equilibrium, one has that,
y2P(θ
0 −  ) ≤ 1+θ
0 −   − H(θ
0 −  )=y1P(θ
0 −  )
This, along with the fact that y2P(θ) <y 1P(θ), implies that necessarily y2P(θ) ≤ y1P(θ) for all θ,
as otherwise there would exist θ
0 and  0 so that y2P(θ
0)=y1P(θ
0) and y2P(θ
0 −  ) >y 1P(θ
0 −  ) for all
 <  0. ¥


































3, we have that









2 (θ). Therefore, as e2P
2 (θ)=e1P
2 (θ), for θ close enough to θ, e2P
2 (θ) >
e1P
2 (θ). So a θ










2 (θ),s ot h a te2P
2 (θ) <e 1P
2 (θ) for θ close enough to θ.¥
14As
H(θ0)
2 + e2(p(θ0),y(θ0));θ0) −
3p(θ0)
2 < 0
2510 Appendix B: Sequential Moves and Communication
This appendix investigates the model for the cases in which the boards move sequentially, and they can
communicate the information they extracted from the CEO.
To address the ﬁrst point, I add a period between 3 and the time at which the CEO decides upon
e1 and e2, and assume that the choice of p b yt h eS u p e r v i s o r yB o a r di sm a d ei ns u c hp e r i o da f t e r
the demanded y by the management board are set (and accepted by the CEO). A relevant issue is
whether the Supervisory Board can infer the project quality from the performance target speciﬁed by
the Management Board. I will be assuming throughout this is the case and show that it will happen in
equilibrium.
At the new period, as the decision regarding y is sunk, the supervisory board chooses the amount of







The solution to this problem is given by
p(y;θ)={
(1+θ−y)
4 if y ≤ 1+θ
0 otherwise
In period 2, the Management Board anticipates that, upon correctly inferring θ, this will be the
amount of monitoring exerted by the Supervisory Board and will then (proceeding as in section 2, just
replacing p by p(y;θ))c h o o s ey so to
max
y≥0
y + p(y;θ)e2(p(y;θ),y;θ) − c(y,p(y;θ);θ) − (
(1 − F(θ)
f(θ)




The solution to this program yields
Proposition 8 If, in a two-tier board system, the supervisory board chooses on monitoring after the
management board sets its target the resulting unique equilibrium has








The induced amount of self-dealing is given by e2(θ)=15
38[
1−F(θ)]
f(θ) ]. Moreover, proﬁts under a unitary
board are (pointwise) higher than in a dual board.
Proof: Follows trivially from the ﬁrst order conditions for the Program in the text and the expressions
for p(y;θ) and e2(p,y;θ). For the second part of the Proposition, it is easy to see, using e1 = y+ e2 − θ
that proﬁts can be written as









15Note that, as it is assumed (and veriﬁed in equilibrium) that the Supervisory Board correctly infers the project’s
quality θ, it can optimally impose the monitoring level p w i t h o u tm a k i n ga n yp a y m e n tt ot h eC E O .
26Note that this expression is strictly decreasing in e1 in the range (1 − H(θ),∞) and strictly decreasing
in e2. As 1 − H(θ) < 1 −
2H(θ)
3 = e1P
1 < 1 −
25H(θ)
38 = e2P
1 and the amount self-dealt is higher under a
two-tier system, the result follows.¥
Note that, under (A1), performance targets are strictly increasing in the project’s quality so that the
supervisory board, upon observing y, can indeed infer the type of the project as assumed in the derivation
of the equilibrium. Moreover, one sees that, when compared to the Unitary System, a Dual Board
System in which the monitoring decisions are taken by the supervisory board after the establishment
of performance targets will reduce the level of both instruments. As a ﬁrst consequence, the amount
self-dealt by the CEO will be higher than in a Unitary System. Secondly, when compared with a unitary
system, proﬁts under a dual system are, for all θ, lower.
Interestingly, the sequential moves’ analysis yields the same outcome as when the supervisory board
communicates the information extracted from the CEO to the supervisory board. To see that, note
ﬁrst that in order to infer the project’s quality the management board has to screen the diﬀerent CEO’s
“types”. This screening has to be done through the oﬀer of a menu of performance targets which depends
on the CEO’s announcement of θ. Therefore, when the information — or, more precisely, the CEO’s
announcement — is communicated to the supervisory board, the target is sunk. Hence, the supervisory’s
board maximization problem is, on the equilibrium path (i.e., when the CEO reports truthfully), the
same as in (7). The management board anticipates this and maximizes the same program as (8). This
proves
Proposition 9 The model when the management board communicates the CEO’s announcement to the
supervisory board yields the same outcome as in which boards move sequentially. Therefore, a dual system
induces (pointwise) lower proﬁts and more self-dealing than a unitary system.
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